Indeed, the world economy appears to be set in a slow growth path, which is likely to delay the great adjustments required at the national and international levels. In addition to the discussion of current trends and policies in the world economy, World Economic Survey contains three special chapters V, VI and VII : chapter V covers the increasingly clear interactions between systemic issues in trade, money and finance; chapter VI covers the effects of adjustment policies on capital formation in developing countries, centrally planned economies and some major developed market economies; and chapter VII covers the major development challenge posed by the economic crisis in sub-Saharan Africa.
The Supplement to World Economic Survey comprises four studies: international monetary reform and the socialist countries; the changing institutional character of international financial markets in the s; countertrade in developing countries; and problems and polices of countries affected by desertification and drought. The crucial role of international trade in reinforcing global demand was evident in , as the growth of world output gradually regained the pace of the late s. Yet the geographical spread of the recovery remained limited, and economic growth in half of the developing countries was still so low that income per capita either continued to fall or stagnated.
This uneven recovery, its sources and the policies conditioning its transmission, as well its short-term prospects, are the focus of World Economic Survey After the most protracted global economic recession since the s, the prospects for sustained and broad-based growth are still not satisfactory. This unresolved issue is the focus of World Economic Survey A major development in was the recovery in North America.
The recovery of the developed market economies as a whole is expected to become more widespread this year, but further strengthening beyond is uncertain. The Supplement to World Economic Survey comprises three studies: exchange rate volatility in an interdependent world economy; some changes in trade among developing countries, ; and wage behaviour in the developed economies.
This form of analysis stands as an important analytical corrective to the crude focus on national power so prevalent in discussions of emerging powers; it directs our attention to the nature of state-society relations and to the evolving role of the state within transnational capitalism; and it highlights the continued reality of inequality, poverty, and social exclusion in many parts of the developing world, including within emerging powers. Each of these narratives can tell us something of importance about today's emerging powers.
But they suffer from important limitations and weaknesses. Taken together these limitations suggest that we should be cautious before consigning ideas of the Third World and of the Global South to the dustbin of history. The first reason for caution rests on a rather different reading of the history of the Third World. Even during the period from the mids to the mids the Cold War was one of several explanatory dynamics. On this account, the calls for an NIEO in the s represented only one element in a much broader historical story, involving the struggle for equal sovereignty, for decolonization, for racial equality and for an equality of cultural status.
Critical and post-colonial scholarship has helped to challenge both the idea of an easy dichotomy between the 'West' and the 'Non-West' and also the confident and complacent image of a global international society created via the universalization of essentially European institutions and European understanding of modernity. Such work has underscored the extent to which the 'West' was itself formed through its long and extremely conflictual engagement with the non-western world; the need to consider the concrete social and political struggles through which western ideas of international order were transposed into different national and regional contexts; 16 and the extent to which the categories of European thought are themselves implicated in the production of a world of hierarchy and domination, however much the specific subjects of domination may be shifting.
Nevertheless it is the intertwining of national and imperial power, of industrialization and western economic success, and of cultural and civilizational hierarchy that sets the crucial historical backdrop for understanding the long-delayed 'emergence' of the non-western world. The 19th century was already full of debates about the changing nature of power and the impact that industrialization and modernization would have on the scale of social and economic organization.
There was an endless discussion of the powers of the future. Thus Toqueville famously pointed to the rise of Russia and the United States. Imperialists such as Seeley were equally convinced that it was only through empire and the creation of a 'global state' that England could prosper both materially and morally in a world in which Russia and America 'would be on altogether higher scale of magnitude'.
Nineteenth century ideas about the changing scale of material power were never just about power and material capabilities. Alongside discussions of the impact of the Industrial Revolution there ran a continuous preoccupation with moral, cultural and civilizational factors. These played a crucial role in determining the status of 'great nations' and who was to count in the international pecking order of the future.
Within Europe, Marx, Mill, Hegel and many others all believed in a hierarchy of nations with only some possessing the necessary moral character and the historically progressive potential. It is important to note the legacy of 19th century ideas about civilizational hierarchy and the way in which they lived on in the hegemonic presumption of the western world through much of the 20th century. For example, the close links between European geopolitical thought and midth century American realism are well known, above all in the work of Nicholas Spykman.
However the overt role of racial hierarchy and civilizational difference that had been central to European geopolitical thinking gets downplayed as it crosses the Atlantic. But race and civilization are submerged rather than wholly dislodged until they reappear once more with full force in their Huntingtonian incarnation and the invocation of clashing civilizations.
23 - The Trilateral Countries in the International Economy of the s ()
Thus, for example, Kennan's view of the regions and states that 'mattered' geopolitically was never a purely clear-headed analysis of the five centres of material power and his assessment of the likely non- development of the Third World was clearly shaped by a view of western cultural superiority and his own crude racial attitudes. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo.
What happens in the South is of no importance. So what does this imply for the analysis of emerging powers today? In the first place, there remains a commonality if not directly in terms of the challengers then certainly in terms of the target of that challenge. From this perspective the crucial point is that we are witnessing a challenge to the 'West'. Sometimes the focus is on the West as a historical formation built around the history of European power and its colonial system that was then inherited, transformed and globalized by the United States. Sometimes arguments centre on the US-centred Greater West and the multilateral institutions created in the post period.
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The language is everywhere ill-defined and fuzzy. But the ubiquity of this kind of language implies that what fundamentally distinguishes today's emerging powers is their historic position outside, or on the margins of, some notion of the West. Second, we need to ask about the legacy of historical perceptions of second-class treatment, of subalternity, of marginalization and of subordinate status within an unequal and exploitative global political and economic system. And a central element of Third World foreign policies was the demand for status, for recognition and respect.
Alfred Sauvy's original coining of the idea of the Third World concluded with precisely this idea: 'For, in the end, this Third World, little known, exploited, scorned like the Third Estate, itself wants to be something Sauvy But those histories also underpin a struggle for recognition and for recognition of being different rather than of becoming the same; they open the possibility that although the surface language of power may appear similar, that language contains distinctive features.
A second reason for not equating the end of the Third World with the end of the Cold War looks not backwards in time but rather to those factors that link the s and the contemporary period. Here it is important to see just how closely the dynamics of emerging powers today were directly the products of western responses to power diffusion and relative power decline during the previous 'crisis of the West' in the s.
One major response to declining US and western hegemony was to foster, encourage and enforce an aggressive phase of liberal globalization, especially of financial globalization. And yet it was precisely the particular character of economic globalization and the debt-fuelled growth that helped to create the conditions both for the successful emerging economies of today and for the current challenges to US and western power and authority. The other central feature of the US policy in the s was to revive a policy of active and aggressive interventionism in the South as part of the Second Cold War.
Again, whilst this may have been a successful element in the victory of the West in the Cold War, it also helped to foster, or deepen, or shift the character of many of the conflicts that are proving so intractable to Washington today, especially in relation to the Islamic world. Seen in terms of both these responses the longs become more important in understanding where we are today; and the end of the Cold War rather less so.
A third reason for believing that the idea of the Third World remains of some relevance to our understanding of today's emerging powers has to do with coalition politics.
For writers such as Robert Rothstein, the Third World of the s was never about shared attributes or legacies of colonialism or particular statist projects of development. It constituted a diplomatic reality. From this perspective it is important to underscore the southern character of the foreign policies of today's emerging powers, the extraordinary growth in South-South trade and economic ties radically different from the s and the formation and persistence of southern coalitions such as the trade G20 within the WTO or groupings such as the Brics especially after South Africa joined in April or the IBSA Trilateral Forum of India, Brazil, and South Africa created in It is certainly the case that, as realists would predict, differences have appeared within the South.
On climate change, for example, there have been significant differences between the BASICs and other developing countries. At Copenhagen, the entry of the BASICs into the closed councils of the most powerful caused intense resentment on the part of countries such as Bolivia.
At Durban, the representatives of small island developing states were still more critical of an India that seemed to stand in the way of a final deal. In the world of formal multilateralism, after all, the G77 is very much alive. A fourth factor has to do with the distinctiveness of today's emerging powers. Even if we place China in a category of its own, countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa are large developing countries that will continue to be relatively poor in per capita terms.
Poverty and inequality remains major problems and high growth rates remain a major political imperative. For all their economic success, they remain developing economies and developing societies marked both by incomplete development and by incomplete integration into a global economy whose ground-rules have been set historically by the industrialized North.
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Moreover a great deal depends on our assessment of the nature and extent of developmental gains and of the actual power shifts that are taking place. It is easy to exaggerate the emerging powers and the extent of the power shift that has taken place. Yes, China, India and Brazil have indeed acquired veto power within the WTO; yes, changes are underway in the voting structures and governance arrangements of the International Financial Institutions IFIs ; and yes, the creation of the G20 does represent an important change in the nature and membership of the top table.
But these changes are, thus far, hardly revolutionary. Developmental policy space remains restricted by the current rules of the global game.
World Economic and Social Survey Archive: 1980-1989
As a result, there remain many areas of common interest and common concern amongst a broad range of developing countries which remain rule-takers far more than rule-makers. Climate change again provides an important example. Hence it may indeed be the case that BASICs have been tempted to stress their special responsibilities and to join clubs or groupings of major emitters, even if, as at Copenhagen, this opens up major divisions with other developing countries. But it remains very hard to think about climate change outside of the context of inequality, poverty and the developmental imperatives of large developing countries.
It may be technically or technologically possible to imagine dealing with climate change without considering inequality and global poverty.
But, from a wide range of moral viewpoints, it would be wholly unacceptable to deal with climate change in a way that would worsen the welfare and life-chances of the currently poor; that would fail to provide sufficient developmental and ecological space for these poor to satisfy their rights to reasonable standards of subsistence and well being; and that would undermine or close off the developmental prospects for the poor of future generations.
I began by noting how the rise of today's emerging powers has challenged many common assumptions about world politics and destabilized many of the taken-for-granted political groupings, historical geographies and spatial categories that have shaped both academic analysis and political understandings. In many cases they seem to make no obvious sense. How can the idea of the South cope with the tremendous heterogeneity of economic performance, state-capacity, social coherence and geopolitical power that now exists across the so-called 'developing world'? What possible sense can it make to see Brazil and Latin America as challengers to the 'West'?
And to resort to the vacuous notion of the 'Rest' is simply to avoid the issue. For some it is therefore obvious that we should seek to analyse emerging powers in terms of broad, universal categories. The three narratives of emergence sketched in the second section involve claims to provide the intellectual resources to understand both the drivers of emerging state behaviour and the ways in which we might best understand the places of these countries in the world. In some cases these claims rest on some universal, or at least very broadly based, social category, whether interest, power or class.
In other cases, the claim for stable categorization rests on a particular view of history and of the direction of history. Nevertheless, the limits of each of the three narratives and the extent to which both analysts and practitioners cannot avoid the messy categories of 'South', 'West', 'North' also tells us something important. As I have suggested, the notion of a Global South remains relevant for understanding the specific but varying identities of major emerging powers, the ways in which these identities are the product of particular histories and socio-historic worldviews and shape more specific interests, and how many within the emerging powers understand the target of their challenge.
We can indeed understand much about emerging powers in terms of how they are seeking to navigate and best position themselves within an existing state-centric, liberal and capitalist order whilst accepting most of the underlying assumptions and values of that order. But the nature of that navigation has been shaped by their historical trajectory within that order and by the developmental, societal and geopolitical context of their emergence. In terms of the contemporary analysis of emerging powers, it becomes very important to resist binary distinctions and lazy dichotomies.
Of course, almost all discussion of globalization recognizes that its impact is highly uneven, as some parts of the world are incorporated into ever denser networks of interdependence whilst other regions are left on, or beyond, the margins. Equally, almost all writers stress the extent to which globalizing forces may produce fragmentation, reaction, or backlash. But to think principally in these polar terms has been to obscure what is most interesting: that, whilst powerful systemic pressures exist, both processes of change and, more important, outcomes vary enormously.
The character and intensity of globalizing pressures depend on geopolitical position, level of development, size, and state strength. Perhaps most crucially in very large, enormously complex, fast-developing states, systemic and global pressures come up against powerful inherited domestic structures and historically embedded modes of thought. It is important, then, both to acknowledge and to analyze the systemic pressures but, at the same time, to unpack and deconstruct the complex processes of break-down and adaptation that have taken place, and to do so in a way that plays close attention to the complex struggles for power both between and within emerging societies.
Sharp changes in international trade, in capital flows and in exchange rates have affected all major economies. The rise in real interest rates everywhere reflects the close links among capital markets. I believe that the U. By increasing American imports and depressing our exports, the over-strong dollar has proven to be a direct stimulus to the economies of Europe, Japan and Latin America. But, at the same time, the American budget deficit has raised real interest rates in the world capital market and induced European governments to pursue contractionary monetary and fiscal policies aimed at offsetting the inflationary pressure caused by the fall in their own currency values.